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Value, Rent, and the Political Economy of Social Media
Jakob Rigi
Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University, Budapest,
Hungary
Robert Prey
Department of Journalism and Media Studies, University of Groningen, Groningen,
The Netherlands
Fuchs (2010, 2012) argues that users of social media produce
value and surplus value in the Marxian sense. Arvidsson and
Colleoni (2012) critique this hypothesis, claiming that Marx’s
theory of value is irrelevant to the regime of value production on
social media platforms in particular and in informational
capitalism in general. They claim that the affective relations and
financial speculations that generate value on social media are not
dependent on labor time. This article critically engages Fuchs,
and Arvidsson and Colleoni, by revisiting Marx’s theory of value.
Contra Fuchs, we argue that audiences do not produce value and
surplus value—neither for social nor for mass media. Contra
Arvidsson and Colleoni, we argue that so-called affective
relations (philia) do not produce value either. Instead we
demonstrate that social media generate revenue from four
primary sources—by leasing advertisement space to generate
advertisement rent, by selling information, by selling services to
advertisers, and by generating profits from fictitious capital and
speculative windfalls. All four, we argue, can be adequately
explained by Marx’s theory of value.
Keywords advertising, fictitious capital, Marx, mass media, rent,
social media, speculation, stock exchange, value
In this article we critique the argument that users of
social media can be understood in the Marxist sense to
be laboring to produce value for social media. Instead we
argue that the expansion of social media needs to be
understood in line with the expansion of rentier capital-
ism in general. We thus attempt to demonstrate the utility
of analyzing the political economy of social media
through Marx’s conceptions of rent and “fictitious
capital.”
Our point of entry is a recent, and very lively, debate
between Fuchs (2010; 2012) and Arvidsson and Colleoni
(2012, hereafter Arvidsson and Colleoni). The first sec-
tion of this article summarizes this exchange within the
context of the “audience commodity” debate, which was
initiated by Dallas Smythe in 1977. In the section that
follows we summarize Marx’s theory of the general form
of surplus value at the point of production and its particu-
lar manifestations in the realm of distribution. This sum-
mary is necessary because the source of both Fuchs’s
and Arvidsson and Colleoni’s mistakes, we believe, is
their confusion of the general form with its particular
manifestations. In the third section we critique Fuchs’s
claim that “prosumers” produce value and surplus value
in two steps. First, we deal with media revenues from
advertisements. We show that the claim that audiences
or “prosumers” produce value and surplus value is mis-
taken for both mass media and social media. We argue
that the price of an ad is a rent paid for advertising space/
time, the magnitude of which primarily depends on the
sociocultural profile of the audience. Second, in regard to
social media, we show that the exchange value of the
data that is provided by prosumers tends toward zero.
Therefore, we argue that any price applied to such data is
best understood as a rent extracted through various
mechanisms of monopoly.
Finally, we critique Arvidsson and Colleoni in two
subsections. First, dealing with Arvidsson’s (2006; 2009)
concept of brand value, we argue that the claim that
affective relations produce the value of brands and adver-
tisements is mistaken. We show that the so-called added
value of the brand is a combination of extra profit,
monopoly rent and speculative windfalls. Using Marx’s
distinction between value and price we argue that
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affective relations, though critical for branding and
advertising, do not produce new value but instead trans-
fer value from some commodities to others. Second, we
reject Arvidsson and Colleoni’s claim that Marx’s theory
of value is irrelevant since the so-called market value of
social media companies depends on financial operations.
Discussing stock exchange, fictitious capital, and specu-
lation, we instead demonstrate that although the largest
portion of incomes generated in the stock exchange does
not originate from surplus value, the production and real-
ization of surplus value are the raison d’e^tre of financial
operations.
First, however, in order to contextualize the debate
between Fuchs and Arvidsson and Colleoni, we want to
briefly discuss the contemporary return of Dallas
Smythe’s argument that the media produces an “audience
commodity.”
THE AUDIENCE COMMODITY DEBATE
In 1977 Dallas Smythe argued that the mass media pro-
duce an audience commodity that is sold to advertisers.
The viewing/reading of ads, according to Smythe, both
reproduces the labor power of the viewer/reader, and
simultaneously contributes to the production of the audi-
ence as a commodity.
Smythe’s “audience commodity” thesis stimulated
much response and critical engagement at the time and
over the years that followed (see Murdock 1978; Livant
1979; Meehan 1984; 1993; Jhally and Livant 1986/2006;
Lebowitz 1986). While discussion had clearly cooled off
by the 1990s, recent years have seen the return of Smythe
and the debate he initiated (see Andrejevic 2002; 2004;
2007; Cohen 2008;Whyte 2010; Kang and McAllister
2011; Caraway 2011; Lee 2011; Fuchs 2012b). The shift
from “mass” to “social” media has been the impetus for
this return. Smythe’s argument appears to be even more
suggestive today with “Web 2.0” and the rise of what can
be called the “prosumer commodity” (Fuchs 2010; Man-
zerolle 2010), as “prosumers,” along with producing con-
tent and viewing ads, produce data that can be sold to
marketers.
It is within this context that the recent debate between
Christian Fuchs (2010; 2012) and Arvidsson and Col-
leoni (2012) must be situated. The debate was initiated
by Fuchs’s article “Labor in Information Capitalism and
on the Internet” (2010). This piece provoked a critique
by Arvidsson and Colleoni entitled “Value in Informa-
tion Capitalism and on the Internet” (2012), which Fuchs
(2012) responded to in a rejoinder.
A central question of contention throughout the debate
has been: What is the form and origin of the revenues
media generate from advertisements? Smythe, to our
knowledge, did not clearly answer, nor even ask, this
question. Instead, Jhally and Livant (1986/2006), build-
ing on Smythe, engage this question directly in regard to
television advertising. However, they offer two contra-
dictory answers. First, they argue that from the point of
view of advertisers, media revenues from ads are a rent
advertisers must pay to gain access to media space/time
(Jhally and Livant 1986/2006, 125). Jhally and Livant
then, however, proceed to argue that media actually pro-
duce the audience commodity that is sold to advertisers.
The value of this audience commodity is produced by
the watching labor of the viewer. Jhally and Livant
divide watching time into necessary watching time and
surplus watching time: an intriguing, though misleading,
analogy to Marx, who divided the working day into nec-
essary time, in which the worker worked to produce the
equivalent of the value of his or her labor power, and sur-
plus time, during which the worker worked to produce
surplus value. For Jhally and Livant, necessary watching
time is when viewers watch the programs they enjoy,
while surplus watching time occurs during the watching
of ads. Watching ads thus produces the surplus value that
is metamorphosed into the profit earned by media capi-
talists. Therefore, in the same breath Jhally and Livant
depict media advertising revenues as generated both
from rent paid by advertisers and from surplus value pro-
duced by viewers. Obviously, these revenues cannot be
both.1
Today, with the emergence of interactive and social
media, Fuchs (2010; 2012) argues that Internet users pro-
duce value and surplus value in two ways. First, they pro-
duce “informational content” that is sold as a commodity
by media to advertisers. Second, they constitute an audi-
ence for advertisements, and by paying attention to ads,
they also produce value and surplus value. It seems that
Fuchs bases his second argument on Jhally and Livant’s
thesis. Like them, he argues that Marx’s law of value can
be applied to media revenues—that labor time is the
measure of the value created in social media—just like it
is the measure of value in broadcast media. “The more
time a user spends on Facebook the more data is gener-
ated about him/her that is offered as a commodity to
advertising clients” (Fuchs 2012, 639).
In their recent critique of Fuchs, Arvidsson and Col-
leoni (2012) claim that social media revenues are impos-
sible to understand via Marx’s theory of value. Rather
than labor time, value on social media is increasingly
connected to the affective quality of social connec-
tions—the so-called philia—that companies attempt to
create between their consumers and with their products.
To further their argument against the relevancy of the
labor theory of value, Arvidsson and Colleoni also point
to the importance that finance capital plays in generating
revenue for social media.
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In order to counter these mistaken positions, it is nec-
essary to begin our critique by briefly summarizing the
most relevant aspects of Marx’s theory of surplus value
and the transformation of surplus value into profit, inter-
est, and rent.
THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
SURPLUS VALUE: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF MARX’S
THEORY
According to Marx, a commodity has two aspects: use
value, which satisfies particular human needs, and value,
which is expressed in the exchange value, the price of
the commodity. The magnitude of value is determined
by the amount of abstract social labor-time necessary for
the production of the commodity. If commodity A is pro-
duced by n different producers, who respectively spend
T1, T2, . . . and Tn times on its production, then the value
of A D T1 C T2 C T3 . . .C Tn  n. (Marx 1976,
125–138).
While the use value of a commodity is a function of its
physical properties, the value of a commodity can only
be expressed and measured relationally through a sepa-
rate object that stands in opposition to it. Money is the
universal form of exchange value, but in expressing its
value in money the commodity purges itself of all traces
of the labor that went into creating it. This presents the
illusion that exchange itself is the origin of value (Marx
1976: 163–177). It appears that the capitalist makes his
or her money by “buying cheap and selling dear.”
Although this might be true—and is true—of individual
capitalists, it is a zero-sum game if all capitalists are con-
sidered together. This is because each capitalist is simul-
taneously a buyer and a seller. Hence, exchange cannot
be the source of the aggregate surplus value. Instead, the
source of surplus value lies in the process of production
(Marx 1976, chapter 5).
The capitalist buys means of production and employs
workers to produce commodities, the exchange value of
which is higher than that of the invested capital. How-
ever, means of production, Marx argues, are not the
source of surplus value either. Instead, the origin of the
added value is labor. Labor produces more value in
the process of production than the value it receives in the
form of wage payments.2 However, Marx qualifies this
argument. Not all wage labor, but only wage labor that
produces commodities produces surplus value. In order
to count as a commodity, not only must a good or service
be produced by human labor but it must also be offered
as a product for general sale on the market.3
Those capitalists who extract surplus value must nec-
essarily share it with other groups, namely, merchants,
bankers, owners of land and advertising space, and the
state. This is because while these groups do not contrib-
ute directly to the production of surplus value, they are
vital for its realization and reproduction. The merchant
sells the commodities, the banker lends money to pro-
ductive capitalists, the landowner supplies the land,
advertising accelerates the sale of commodities, and the
state takes care of the external necessary conditions for
the reproduction of capital. The distribution of surplus
value among these groups does not take place directly at
the point of production but indirectly through mecha-
nisms of market, finance, and taxes. Therefore, the por-
tions of surplus value appropriated by these groups
appear in transformed and mystified forms: profit for
industrial and commercial capitalists, interest for money
lenders, rent for the owners of real and virtual space, and
taxes for the state. All these categories, with the excep-
tion of taxation, belong to the realm of the market and
their magnitudes are influenced by the interplay between
supply and demand. Therefore, the surplus value trans-
formed into each of these forms appears as originating
from exchange and not from production. Profit appears
as the fruit of capital, interest of money, and rent of
space. In other words, capital, money, and space appear
to have inherent value and the capacity to generate new
value (Marx 1991).
The mainstream economist takes these mystified
forms at face value. Marx’s dialectical method, on the
other hand, is comprised of two stages. First, it abstracts
from surface phenomena in the realm of the market
(profit, interest, rent, etc.) and delves into the depths of
production (Marx 1993, 100–108). There it discovers the
laws of value and surplus value (Marx 1976). Second, on
the basis of this discovery, it returns to these surface phe-
nomena and integrates them into a whole, showing that
profit, interest, and rent are in fact manifestations of sur-
plus value (Marx 1991).
Before moving on to critique Fuchs’s position, it is
crucial to clarify the difference between value and price,
as this difference comes up several times in our discus-
sion. The relation between labor-time (value) and money
(price) is that of essence and appearance. In the capitalist
economy commodities are sold not at their values but at
their prices. While there exists a general correspondence
between value and price, the law of supply and demand
ensures that some commodities are sold above their value
(higher prices) while others are sold below their value
(lower prices). Those commodities with higher effective
demand absorb into themselves portions of the value of
commodities with lower effective demand. This means
that sellers of the first type make extra profit at the
expense of sellers of the second type.
Furthermore, certain objects can have prices without
being the product of social labor (a painting, for exam-
ple) or they may not be the product of labor at all (virgin
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land, shares in the stock market). In a Marxian sense we
could say that these objects have a price but no value.4
The origin of this price is the monopoly right of the
owner over the object. This is a crucial point to remem-
ber for our discussion of rent and fictitious capital later
on.
ADVERTISING AND THE EXTRACTION OF RENT:
FUCHS’ FIRST MISTAKE
As we have already mentioned, Fuchs (2010; 2012) fol-
lows Jhally and Livant (1986) in arguing that the online
audience produces value and surplus value, the magni-
tude of which is determined by their watching time. In
this section we critique this thesis by employing Marx’s
theory of value. We show that the attention that audien-
ces pay to ads does not produce value and surplus value,
either for mass media or for social media.
Mass Media and Advertising Revenues
In what follows we use CPT to evaluate whether mass
media audiences produce value. Cost per thousand
(CPT), or cost per mille (CPM), is of course the adver-
tisement industry’s benchmark to calculate the relative
costs of an advertising campaign. It is the price that the
advertiser pays to reach one thousand audience members
through a certain medium. Analyzing CPT/CPM for vari-
ous media we show that audiences do not produce value
and surplus value.
For the sake of argument let’s follow Smythe and
Jhally and Livant and say that the audience, by watching
or reading advertisements, performs abstract social labor
that produces value. In this case, CPT represents (in
price-form) the value that one thousand readers of an
advertisement in a given newspaper, or one thousand
viewers of a commercial on a given television network,
produce through performing abstract labor.
It is surely beyond dispute that the reading of any one-
page ad in any newspaper takes roughly the same amount
of time and requires the same amount of energy. The
same would seem to be true for watching a 30-second
television commercial, or reading/watching the same ad
on different Internet sites. In Marxist terms then, such
reading or watching requires the same amount of abstract
social labor. From this it follows that if we want to claim
that the audience “labors,” then one thousand readers of
any newspaper ad, one thousand viewers of any televi-
sion commercial, or one thousand visitors to a particular
ad on any website, should produce the same (audience)
commodity of the same value regardless of the ad, or the
newspaper, TV network, or Internet site where it appears.
The reason is that one thousand readers/viewers/visitors
would use the same amount of abstract labor (energy) to
pay attention to any one ad. Therefore, CPT/CPM—
which is the price expression of value—must remain
approximately the same, and not display any large varia-
tions between newspapers, TV networks, or websites.5 In
other words, CPT should not be affected by the demo-
graphics or sociocultural background of the audience.
Clearly though this is not the case. We ask the reader
to refer to Table 1, which shows the CPTs for a range of
newspapers in the United States. While the average CPT
for all newspapers in the United State is $71.4, CPT
varies radically between different newspapers. For
instance CPTs for the Wall Street Journal, The New York
Times, USA Today, The Kansas City Star, and The Stock-
ton Record are respectively $44.50, $33.20, $25.70,
$143.90, and $393.40. Thus, the cost of advertising per
one thousand audience members in The Stockton Record
is 15.3 times higher than in USA Today.
We can see similar variations if we compare the CPTs
of television networks. Table 2 shows the 30-second
peak adult CPTs for major U.S. television networks.
While the average CPT for all commercial channels is
$19.50, Fox has the highest CPT of $28.10, while CBS
has the lowest ($14.50).
TABLE 1
CPT for B/W ads in select U.S. newspapers
Newspapers CPT
Wall Street Journal $44.5
The New York Times $33.2
USA Today $25.7
Los Angeles Times $66.4
The Indianapolis Star $90.0
Kansas City Star $143.9
The Stockton Record $393.4
San Jose Mercury News $202.7
Belleville News Democrat $45.7
Note. Figures can be found on pages 189, 191, and 194 of Austin,
Barnard, Galli, and Hutcheon (2011).
TABLE 2







Note. Figures can be found on page 185 of Austin et al. (2011).
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Table 3 shows average CPMs for different types of
sites on the net. Again we can observe significant varia-
tions. Online newspapers have the highest CPM
(US$6.99), which is 12.48 times higher than the average
CPM of $0.56 for social networking sites.
Tables 4 and 5 show respectively the lowest, the aver-
age, and the highest CPTs for newspapers and television
in different countries across the Americas. Upon first
glance at these tables what becomes immediately clear is
the variation between CPTs, both within the same coun-
try and between different countries in the Americas. For
example, the data show that the average CPT for newspa-
pers in the United States and Brazil is respectively
$71.40 and $153.19, and the average CPT for television
in the United States and Argentina is respectively $19.50
and $69.70.
What are we to make of such dramatic variations in
CPTs/CPMs? If audiences produce value, then why
would one thousand readers of The Stockton Record pro-
duce 15.3 times more value than the same number of
USA Today readers? Or why should the same number of
visitors to newspaper sites on the Internet produce
12.48 times higher value than do “prosumers” on social
networking sites?
The only explanation is that CPT does not represent
the transformation of audience-produced value into
price. Audiences are not engaged in value-producing
labor when they read, watch, or hear an ad. How could it
be otherwise, since the abstract labor (energy) to pay
attention to any one-page ad, any 30-second commercial,
or any online banner ad, by one thousand readers/view-
ers, is equivalent?
It would seem instead that the major portion of
CPT/CPM is rather a rent that media owners extract
from advertisers (although CPT may also include the
cost of the production of the advertisement).6 The
money paid by advertisers to media is perhaps best
understood as an exchange of rent for hope: the poten-
tial of generating greater future sales.7 Instead of the
audience being the commodity, we argue that advertis-
ing space (in the case of press media) or advertising
time (in the case of television) is the commodity. The
price of such advertising space or time is dependent on
the projected profile of the readers/viewers attracted to
this space/time. Class, gender, generation, race,
national differences, and corresponding cultural habi-
tuses, among other factors, are all major aspects of
audiences’ profiles.
In this respect, comparison with the buying or renting
of retail space is illuminating. The price or rent of retail
space on any city street is determined by its size, loca-
tion, and the socioeconomic position and cultural status
of the inhabitants of the neighborhood where it is
located. Likewise, the media lease newspaper pages or
television screens to advertisers. The fees they receive
are not derived from the value produced by the readers
or viewers but from rents paid by the advertisers. As
TABLE 3











Note. Figures can be found on page 209 of Austin et al. (2011).
TABLE 4
CPT for B/W newspaper ads across the Americas
Country Lowest Average Highest
Argentina $12.90 $15.50 $23.10
Brazil $15.33 $153.19 $953.62
Canada $12.08 $77.96 $182.22
Colombia $8.30 $36.95 $264.70
Ecuador $7.90 $25.20 $48.90
Peru $5.00 $26.30 $150.00
Puerto Rico $16.70 $30.10 $42.30
United States $24.10 $71.40 $385.80
Note. Figures compiled from data on page 19, 32, 51, 52, 71, 102,
149, 167, 192, 193, and 195, respectively, of Austin et al. (2011).
TABLE 5
CPT for 30-second peak television ads across
the Americas
Country Lowest Average Highest
Argentina $43.80 $69.70 $85.70
Canada $4.82 $15.22 $33.80
Ecuador $13.80 $16.20 $20.90
Mexico $11.61 $39.04 $48.54
Peru $1.60 $4.90 $8.90
Puerto Rico $10.00 $14.10 $15.40
United States $14.50 $19.50 $28.10
Note. Figures compiled from data on page 5 and 17, 5 and 49, 5
and 100, 215, 147, 164, and 185, respectively, of Austin et al. (2011).
396 J. RIGI AND R. PREY
Caraway (2011, 701) writes, “Speculation on the size and
quality of the audience determines the rent charged to the
advertiser.”8
Social Media and Advertisement Revenues
In the case of social media, CPT/CPM ceases to be an
adequate method for measuring advertising prices. While
mass media audiences are differentiated between differ-
ent newspapers or between different television networks,
they are homogenized9 within the same newspaper or the
same television network for a particular program at a par-
ticular time. Mass media audiences usually belong to
particular social categories, within particular countries,
or regions of those countries.10 Social media, on the
other hand, have a global reach. Furthermore, social
media specify and segment their audiences according to
their interests, their tastes, their networking capacities,
their connections to influential network links, and
according to affective relations that are created. There-
fore, the pricing of advertisements in social media is gov-
erned by a more complex regime, which is still emerging.
In the following, with the help of Arvidsson and Colleoni
(2012) and Gerlitz and Helmond (2011), we briefly
describe this regime. Then we show how this regime of
pricing also demonstrates that social media users do not
produce value and surplus value.
Arvidsson and Colleoni (2012) argue that there is no
correspondence between the time that users spend on
social media platforms and the time they may spend pay-
ing attention to ads. There may have existed a correlation
between the duration of attention time and the price of
ads for early Internet advertising in the 1990s when the
metric for banner ads was simple page views or “hits.”
This changed with the multiplication of websites, as the
same user would typically browse several webpages, and
the number of clicks on an ad on a particular webpage
became more important in determining advertising price.
Click-through rates are not the main metric for social
media, though, as the click rate is particularly low.
Instead, affective relations that emerge through network-
ing are more important in deciding the price of advertis-
ing space. For example, Google’s PageRank metric
considers both the number of links and their quality (net-
work centrality) to determine influence. Social media are
currently pioneering a fourth regime for determining
advertising prices that has been called the “like econo-
my” (Gerlitz and Helmond 2011). In this economy the
major determinant of price is not the number of links
between webpages but rather the direct engagement of
users. Such engagement is measured through “social but-
tons” such as Facebook’s “like” button, Twitter’s
“retweet” button, or bookmarking buttons on Digg or
Reditt (Arvidsson and Colleoni 2012). Through social
buttons the creation of “webs of affective attachments
around informational objects” (144) becomes a more sig-
nificant factor for determining advertising price than
time spent online. Some media scholars (Bermejo 2009;
Napoli 2011) describe this as a shift from older
“exposure models” that focused primarily on the time
audiences spend with media to newer “performance
models” of measuring the audience.
To sum up, following Gerlitz and Helmond (2011),
Arvidsson and Colleoni identify four regimes of pricing
in relation to advertising on the Internet: the “hit,” the
“click,” the “link,” and the “like.” Of these four, only
with the “hit” does time, they claim, correspond to the
value of advertising space. Since the determination of
the price of advertising on contemporary social media is
dominated by the other three regimes, there is no direct
relation between time spent on social media and the price
of an ad (Arvidsson and Colleoni 2012).
The lack of any correspondence between the time that
users spend on social media and the prices of ads is evi-
dence of the fact that social media users do not produce
the exchange value that is embodied in the price of ads.
There has to be some correspondence for the labor theory
of value to hold true. This is why we argue that social
media, like mass media before it, extract rent in
exchange for the lease of (virtual) space (see Chen 2003;
Caraway 2011).11 As with mass media, the profile of the
audience is an important factor for determining the rent,
but in social media the profile is individualized and local-
ized. Furthermore, the networking activities of audien-
ces, the intensity of these activities, and the influences
and affective relations that they produce also become
important factors in determining the rent.
For both mass and social media, the fact that the num-
ber and profile of the audience influence the amount of
rent creates the illusion that the audience is the source of
value. We may call this audience fetishism, a particular
manifestation of commodity fetishism. As Richard Max-
well (1991, 31) pointed out in an insightful critique of
the audience commodity thesis, “Because the audience
carries a price and can be bought and sold for profit, it
appears as though money grows out of watching; in this
way it assumes the form of a commodity” (emphasis
added).
MARX’S THEORY OF VALUE AND THE PRICE OF
INFORMATION: FUCHS’ SECONDMISTAKE
Nonetheless, there is clearly something more going on
when we log on to our social media accounts. From
Twitter comments to Facebook “likes,” we leave behind
a rapidly expanding trail of digital footprints online.
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Indeed, the entire principle that underlies Web 2.0 plat-
forms is the massive provision and storage of personal
(ly) (identifiable) data: systematically evaluated, mar-
keted, and used for targeted advertising. The “work of
watching” morphs seamlessly into the “work of being
watched,” as Andrejevic (2002) astutely described it
early on. Given this, it is not surprising that Dallas
Smythe and the audience commodity debate should
experience something of a revival today.
Christian Fuchs (2010, 2012b) has been at the fore-
front of this revival. Fuchs argues that social media users
produce “informational content” (e.g., status updates,
personal data), which is appropriated and sold as com-
modities by social media. Borrowing from Toffler
(1980), he refers to users of social media platforms as
“prosumers” (Fuchs 2010, 190). It is thus the unpaid
labor of prosumers that creates the exchange value of the
informational content that is sold, the magnitude of
which is determined by labor time.
As intriguing as we find this idea, we argue instead
that informational content12 produced by prosumers has
no exchange value because it can be reproduced digitally
and transported electronically at negligible cost and
time.13 Indeed, such is the case with all information in an
era of digital reproduction.
Consider for example a piece of information K and the
time spent on its production, tK. If we make M additional
digital copies of K, the average time spent on producing
a single copy is (t) D tK/M C 1. We do not include the
time spent on copying this information in the equation
because we assume that such time is negligible. With the
increase of M, (t) will decrease. For instance, if the origi-
nal time spent on the production of software is 100 hours
and if the software is copied digitally by 99,999 users,
the time spent on each copy will be 1/1000 hour, or
3.6 seconds. For 999,999 users, (t) will be 0.36 seconds,
and for 9,999,999 users it will be 0.036. Although mathe-
matically 3.6, 0.36, and 0.036 are values, economically
they can be considered equal to zero.
The “information commodity” thus differs drastically
from physical goods and most services, where, all condi-
tions being equal, the cost and time spent on the repro-
duction of the commodity are equal to those spent on its
production.14 While the initial creation of information
may require huge amounts of labor time, it requires
almost no labor-time to be reproduced. As Marx put it, it
is the social labor time required to reproduce—not pro-
duce—a commodity that determines its value (see Teix-
eira and Rotta 2012).
Information/knowledge is unique in that it is a univer-
sal commons15: It can exist everywhere simultaneously
and it is nonrivalrous (its use does not deplete its use
value). This means that data defy the commodity and
value forms. Producers of information, whether waged
or unwaged,16 produce not commodities, but rather uni-
versal commons. Since data has no exchange value they
must be fenced in17 and kept artificially scarce in order
to justify their price. Thus, a price on data can best be
understood as a form of monopoly rent (tribute).
At this point a few important supplementary notes are
in order: First, while the information that prosumers pro-
duce has no exchange value (and therefore they do not
produce surplus value), the services provided by social
media companies—such as the extraction of information,
and analyzing, structuring, upgrading, storing, customiz-
ing, and tailoring it to the needs of particular adver-
tisers—can potentially, but not necessarily, have
exchange value. Here, the produced commodity is the
service itself not the information. Likewise, teaching is a
service that processes and produces information. How-
ever, what is sold in a private profit-making school is not
information but rather the service of teaching. Obviously,
teaching cannot be reproduced at zero cost.
We say that the services social media companies pro-
vide can potentially, but not necessarily, have exchange
value because most of these tasks are performed automat-
ically by machines. To the extent that labor is involved in
the production of these services, this labor produces value
and surplus value. But this is not the labor of prosumers
but rather that of the employees of social media compa-
nies. In the case of Facebook, collecting data, analyzing
data, securing the storage of data, connecting to websites,
and matching various forms of structured data are the
main functions of the company.18 However, much of the
software that enables these services is produced in an
open-source manner in which Facebook’s employees
cooperate with contributions from outside the company
(Thusoo et al. 2010). Although this software has no
exchange value, it enables Facebook to produce cheaper
services compared to its competitors, and thereby to
extract surplus profit.
To sum up, while information/knowledge has no
exchange value, the service of processing information/
knowledge may have exchange value, and therefore the
knowledge workers who perform this labor may produce
value and surplus value. However, prosumers do not pro-
duce such services.
Now, the following question arises. If information has
no exchange value, what happens to the value of the
input factors (such as technology and labor power) that
went into its production? We argue that these values are
not transferred to the product. Also, the costs of storing,
maintaining, and transporting information are not trans-
ferred to the stored, maintained, or transported informa-
tion, as such information can be reproduced at almost
zero cost.19 From the point of view of capital, our argu-
ment is tantamount to claiming that certain productive
factors evaporate into the air. But if considered from the
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point of view of use values, they do not disappear but
instead become eternally embodied in the universal
information commons. Also, while information in the
form of applied knowledge (design, software, applied
sciences embodied in machines) plays a key role in mate-
rial/industrial production, it too does not contribute to the
exchange value of the commodities that it facilitates,
because it has no value in the first place. It is part of the
universal commons of general intellect (Marx 1976;
1991; 1993, 704–706). Although the sustained expansion
of the general intellect is a condition for the accumula-
tion of both total social capital and individual capital, the
general intellect itself has no value.20
That input factors may have high exchange values
while the produced information has none is a contradic-
tion that lies at the heart of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion. According to Marx (1976), exchange value and use
value have an antagonistic relation in the capitalist mode
of production. The first represents the private interests of
the capitalists and the second the collective interests of
members of society. With information this contradiction
takes its most radical form, as its use by one does not
exclude its use by another. With information, use value
annihilates exchange value, that is, the capitalist form of
production and its abstract value factors. Exchange value
can only be imposed on information by means of enclo-
sure,21 backed by the state. Hence, the price that the capi-
talist extracts in exchange for it is a form of tribute.
We can now hypothetically identify four methods
through which social media can generate income. The
first is through leasing advertisement space to generate
advertisement rent. The second is from the sale of infor-
mation. The third is through the sale of services to adver-
tisers and others, such as the collecting, analyzing,
storage, and delivery of data. The fourth is in financial
markets through selling shares and through speculation.
Of these four, only the third may include the production
of surplus value, through the labor of the employees of
social media companies. As we have already dealt with
the first three mechanisms, we deal with financial opera-
tions in the last section of this article.
A CRITIQUE OF ARVIDSSON AND COLLEONI
We now turn to Arvidsson and Colleoni’s critique of
Fuchs, as presented in their essay “Value in Information
Capitalism and on the Internet.” We have already cred-
ited Arvidsson and Colleoni for their description of the
complex and emerging regime of determining advertise-
ment prices in social media. We have also endorsed their
critique of Fuchs: that prosumers do not produce value in
the Marxian sense since there is no correspondence
between attention time and advertising prices. However,
we reject their claim that Marx’s theory of value is irrele-
vant for understanding the political economy of social
media. We deal with Arvidsson and Colleoni’s argu-
ments in two steps: First we challenge their claim of the
relations between “philia,” brand, and value. Then we
critique their argument that Marx’s theory of value can-
not explain the importance of financial operations on the
so-called market value of social media companies.
Philia, Brand Value, and Advertisement Rent
We agree with much of Arvidsson and Colleoni (2012)
and the Arvidsson (2005) description of the sociocultural
process of branding and the argument that affective rela-
tions play a significant role in branding. However, we
reject the thesis that such affective relations create the
value of a branded commodity or the brand itself.
Arvidsson and Colleoni (2012, 142) suggest that infor-
mational capitalism in general, and social media compa-
nies in particular, deploy “an affective ”law“ of value”:
The values of companies and their intangible assets are set not in
relation to an objective measurement, like labor time, but in rela-
tion to their ability to attract and aggregate various kinds of affec-
tive investments, like intersubjective judgments of their overall
value or utility in terms of mediated forms of reputation.
In other words, value on social media platforms
derives mainly from intangibles—from the affective
labor that helps to build relations between a company’s
stakeholders, consumers, employees, subcontractors, and
the public at large. Brands are arguably the most impor-
tant intangible asset. Elsewhere, Arvidsson (2005, 236)
explains that he sees brands as “mechanisms that enable
a direct valorization of people’s ability to create trust,
affect and shared meanings: their ability to create some-
thing in common.” These positive, affective community
bonds are what he refers to as “philia” (Arvidsson,
2009). Following autonomist Marxists like Maurizio
Lazaratto, Arvidsson (2005, 241) argues that “surplus
value becomes (partially) based on the ability of immate-
rial labor to produce ‘surplus community.’”
What are we to make of this position? The first thing
that we need to do here is to distinguish between an
advertisement and a brand. An advertisement is a dis-
course aimed at attaching particular images to a particular
product or service. A brand consists of socially recog-
nized and communicated images attached to a product or
service. Advertisements present a product in a special
guise in order to persuade consumers to buy it. Brands
are about product differentiation, which advertising cer-
tainly helps with. A brand’s credibility can also come
from its history, power, influence, and prestige. There-
fore, advertising media and owners of brands have
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL MEDIA 399
different, though partially overlapping, interests. While
ad revenues are pocketed by media owners as a rent that
is paid for media space, brand revenues come from the
sale of branded commodities, or from franchising the
brand, and belong to the owners of these products or
services.
An increase in the philia for a brand increases the
demand for it and thereby increases its prices. The effec-
tiveness of an advertising medium in creating philia may
also increase the rent of the advertising space in that
medium. However, contra Arvidsson, we argue that phi-
lia does not produce new value but instead helps the
owner of the brand to appropriate a larger portion of the
surplus value produced by workers in the realm of pro-
duction.22 This takes three forms. First, philia helps the
owner of the brand sell his or her commodity above its
value, and thus to earn extra profits. Second, it allows the
owner to extract monopoly rent through copyright and
patent regimes by franchising the brand. We explain
these two mechanisms in what follows. The third source
of a brand’s revenue is derived from the profit of ficti-
tious capital and speculation in the stock market. We
briefly discuss this in the following as a prelude to a
more in-depth discussion of fictitious capital, the stock
exchange, and speculation. In doing so, we hope to dem-
onstrate the error of Arvidsson and Colleoni’s under-
standing of financial operations.
Surplus Profit of the Brand
In the capitalist market, commodities are not necessarily
sold for prices equal to their values. Depending on the
interplay between supply and demand, commodities are
sold at prices either above, below, or equal to their val-
ues. Those capitalists who manage to sell their com-
modities at prices above their value make profits above
the surplus value incorporated in their commodities. By
contrast, those who sell their commodities below their
values but above the production cost make profits that
are smaller than the surplus values incorporated in their
commodities. Those who sell at or below production
cost do not make profit and are doomed to bankruptcy.
As the buying power of any given society at any given
time is limited, consumer preference for some commod-
ities decreases the effective demand for other commodi-
ties.23 In this way the differences between the values
and prices of the commodities that are sold for prices
below their values are transferred to the prices of those
commodities that are sold for prices above their values.
As a result, the sellers of the commodities with higher
demand make surplus profits at the expense of the sellers
of commodities with lower demand. Branding plays a
central role in such a transfer of value by enhancing the
effective demand for branded commodities. Arvidsson
and Colleoni thus confuse the transfer of value with the
production of value. We thus argue that Arvidsson and
Colleoni take the fetishism of the brand at face value.
Those who sell their commodities for prices higher than
their value may recover part or the whole cost of adver-
tisements from the additional profit they make. However,
this does not mean that the initial advertisement costs
contributed to the value of these commodities, or to the
extra profits that are earned by the brand. In short, brands
may help shift demand from one commodity to another
and allow the company that produces the branded com-
modity to charge a higher price for the commodity, but a
brand does not increase the value of a commodity.
Brands and Monopoly Rents
A brand can also generate monopoly rent in two ways.
First, to the extent that a particular brand is exclusive
and cannot be substituted by similar brands, the seller of
the commodity can extract a monopoly rent on top of the
surplus profit. Although analytically the surplus profit
and monopoly rent earned through the brand are two dif-
ferent categories, in practice they are aggregated in the
total profit of the seller. Second, the owner of a brand
may forgo producing the brand and instead extract a
monopoly rent by franchising the brand to those who are
willing to produce the branded commodity. In this way
monopoly rent is extracted through intellectual property.
Brand as intellectual property is thus a major source of
monopoly rent (see also Harvey 2012).
Brands and Earnings Through Speculation
Brands become an important object of speculation in the
stock exchange (Arvidsson, 2006). However, financial
speculation and the institution of the stock exchange cer-
tainly predate the contemporary significance of branding.
The stock exchange grew out of the requirement for the
large-scale production of surplus value, and the produc-
tion of surplus value continues to be the principle reason
for the very existence of the stock exchange. It is to this
topic that we now turn.
Fictitious Capital, the Stock Exchange, and
Speculation
Arvidsson and Colleoni, in their critique of Fuchs,
declare that the creation of value on social media is pri-
marily generated through two mechanisms. We have
already dealt with the first mechanism, which, following
Arvidsson (2009), we have called “philia.” We have
shown how philia does not actually produce value but
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instead transfers value that is produced by labor. It is
now time to deal with the second mechanism that Arvids-
son and Colleoni argue is responsible for value creation
on social media—financial operations. Arvidsson and
Colleoni claim that financial operations are the main
source of value on social network platforms such as
Facebook. What is more, they argue that this fact proves
the irrelevance of Marx’s theory of value for explaining
the political economy of social media.
We agree that financialization is central to understand-
ing the political economy of social media. Social media
platforms, in particular Facebook, have very high price-
to-earnings (PE) ratios.24 However, in what follows we
instead show that Marx’s theory of value is essential for
understanding the centrality of these financial operations.
Fictitious Capital
The emergence and consolidation of banks as the specific
institutions of money-capital, and their hegemony over
the rest of the economy, have capitalized all streams of
income. M—C—M’ becomes simply M—M0: Money
creates more money. Any revenue is considered as inter-
est on interest bearing capital, with capitalized price
determined by the magnitude of the revenue divided by
the interest rate (capitalized price D revenue  interest
rate).25 This revenue can be profit, rent, interest, tribute,
tax, and so on. For example, the capitalized price of a rev-
enue of USD1 million at 2% interest rate is 1,000,000 
0.02 D USD50,000,000. Marx calls this fictitious capital
because this is not real capital invested in the process of
the production of surplus value; it is hypothetical capital
that is imagined on the basis of the assumption that any
revenue is interest on capital. Fictitious capital is a central
aspect of the stock exchange (Hilferding, [1910] 1981).
Although the main purpose of the joint-stock company
(a business owned by its shareholders) is productive
investment in the direct extraction of surplus value, com-
panies like Facebook, which do not produce surplus
value but extract rent, can also issue shares. Shares are
entitlements to dividends that originate from the income
of joint stock companies: income generated outside the
stock exchange. The advantage of the stock exchange
from the point of view of shareholders is that they can
recover their money by selling their shares at any time.
So we have two different parallel economic opera-
tions, separated from each other spatially, temporally,
and economically, one in the stock exchange, the other
in the joint-stock company. However, these two pro-
cesses are related. As dividends come from company
revenues and these revenues are ultimately portions of
the total social surplus value produced by workers, shares
are entitlements to these portions of the total surplus
value. Therefore, the production of surplus value outside
the stock exchange is the economic foundation of the
stock exchange (Hilferding [1910] 1981).
Selling one’s shares in the stock exchange for a price
above their purchase price can also generate a profit.
This profit, which is the profit of fictitious capital, does
not originate from surplus value and belongs to a differ-
ent category from dividends. However the price of the
shares, and as a result the profit of the fictitious capital,
depends on the size of dividends. The higher the real or
the projected dividends of a company, the higher is the
price of its shares, and as result the higher is the profit of
its fictitious capital. The size of dividend per share ulti-
mately relies on the rate of profit, which has a positive
correlation with the rate of surplus value, which is the
rate of exploitation.26
Speculation and Speculative Windfalls
Shares are bought and sold on a daily basis in the stock
exchange for speculative reasons.
Speculation is a special function of the stock
exchange. Speculative windfalls, however, do not result
from an increase in a company’s profit or rent but rather
from fluctuations in their amounts. Speculations about
changes in the direction and rate of the amount of profit
or rent result in fluctuations in share prices. Share prices
depend on the rate of interest on the one hand, and the
amount of dividends on the other. The rate of interest is,
in a given time period, fixed by the government, unless
sudden unexpected dramatic external events such as war,
revolution, or natural disaster drain the money supply.27
Speculating on the direction of change in the amount
and rate of the dividends, speculators try to buy shares
cheap and sell them dear. Aside from fluctuations in the
amount of generated income, the interplay between sup-
ply and demand within the stock exchange influences the
prices of shares. Actually, speculation itself, combined
with the fluctuating moods and expectations of specula-
tors, creates continuous ebbs and flows in supply and
demand. The resultant change in price instigates a new
wave of speculation, resulting in new changes in supply
and demand and thereby prices (Hilferding [1910] 1981).
MARX’S THEORY OF VALUE AND INCOMES FROM
FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
To sum up, the stock exchange operates in relation to the
joint-stock company that produces value and surplus
value, or (as with social media companies) receives rent
from other companies that produce value and surplus
value. The amount of fictitious capital behind a particular
company in the stock exchange depends on its
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profitability or ability to extract rent outside the stock
exchange, which in turn relies on the extraction of sur-
plus value from workers. This is most evident in times of
bankruptcy and crisis when a dramatic fall in the rate of
industrial profit causes a dramatic depreciation in share
prices. The collapse of profit causes a decrease in the
amount of rent as well. In short, without the production
of value the smoke of the stock exchange will vanish
immediately.
In the stock exchange, capitalist property, taking the
form of titles to revenue, appears to be independent of
the production of value and surplus value in the process
of production. Such property, disconnected from use
value, acquires the homogeneous form of lending capital.
Its value appears to be determined by its yield. Therefore,
the relation between the property and its yield is a purely
quantitative relation. It appears that money, through
some magical force, gives birth to more money. Arvids-
son and Colleoni, taking this mystified form at face value
and deceived by the self-referentiality of fictitious capi-
tal, denounce—mistakenly—the relevance of Marx’s
theory of value for understanding the workings of finan-
cial capital.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that a more careful understanding of the
relation between rent and surplus value is essential for
grasping the political economy of social media. Marx’s
theory of rent is not separable from his theory of value
and indeed must be understood as an essential compo-
nent of his general theory of capital. Rent is a portion of
the surplus value that is produced by wage-laborers and
independent workers. As the Marxist economist Isaak
Illich Rubin (1972, 46n1) wrote, even though the cate-
gory of rent does not “directly express relations between
commodity producers through the products of their labor,
it is nevertheless related to these relations and can be
explained in terms of them. In other words, the theory of
rent is derived from the theory of value.”
The strength and brilliance of Marx’s analysis of capi-
talism is his insistence on relating the parts with the
whole(s). Using this method he showed that profit, inter-
est, and rent are the forms of surplus value in the realms
of exchange and distribution and therefore constituted
portions of the total social surplus value produced by the
total social labor in the realm of production (Marx 1981).
In conclusion, the “work” of watching ads does not
produce surplus value. Advertisers do not buy “audience
power,” as Fuchs would have it, but instead rent access
to potential future consumers. Prosumers also do not pro-
duce surplus value through the information-work that
they engage in, because, as discussed earlier, information
in an era of digital reproduction has an exchange value
bordering on zero.
For the information capitalist, enclosure is a means of
extracting extra surplus value (in the case of trade
secrets) or monopoly rent (through intellectual property).
Both extra surplus value and monopoly rent represent
value that is produced by workers outside the sphere of
information production. Those who argue that social
media users produce surplus value effectively deny the
fact that it is primarily labor that is exchanged outside
the media with capital that produces the rents for media
and hence is exploited by media capitalists. The claim of
users to a share of this rent under the pretext that they
produce it is a demand to partner with media capitalists
in exploiting the working class.
That said, the fact that information has no exchange
value does not imply that those who produce information
or knowledge, including “prosumers,” cannot be
exploited. The form that the exploitation of information-
knowledge producers takes is the expropriation of the
universal commons of information by capital, whether
through trade secrets or through intellectual property.
The enclosure of information-knowledge is not only the
exploitation of direct producers of information-knowl-
edge but also of humanity at large. This is because new
information-knowledge is produced through processing
existing information-knowledge, which is part of the gen-
eral intellect—the product of the collective intellect of
humanity at large. In this way the rentier capitalist is
involved in a twofold form of exploitation, forms that
mutually condition each other. The rentier capitalist
expropriates the use value of the commons of knowledge
from those who produce it and from the rest of humanity
and then uses this enclosure to extract value from value-
producing waged and unwaged labor. As argued else-
where (Rigi n.d.), this twofold exploitation is the defining
characteristic of contemporary information capitalism.
Workers who produce information-knowledge,
whether waged or unwaged (prosumers are just one
instance of unwaged knowledge producers), and pro-
ducers of surplus value occupy two different position in
relation to capital. This difference creates a certain con-
tradiction between the two strata that can be economi-
cally and politically exploited by capital. The knowledge
worker has simultaneously a more radical and a less radi-
cal position vis-a-vis capital in comparison to the pro-
ducer of surplus value. He or she has a more radical
position because he or she produces commons that
exceed the capitalist mode of production. He or she has a
less radical position because under the capitalist system,
his or her wages are derived from a portion of the surplus
value produced elsewhere. Indeed, capitalists bribe elite
knowledge workers by sharing with them the rents and
tributes they extract from producers of surplus value.
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Producers of surplus value, on the other hand, confront
capital from a position within the capitalist mode of pro-
duction. They bargain for a larger portion of the value
they produce, usually without questioning the system
itself. In this sense, they are less radical than knowledge
workers. However, they can also question the capitalist
mode of production by claiming the whole working day
for themselves (society). This would only be possible
through the transformation of capitalism into a new mode
of production. Indeed, commons-based peer production,
established by a segment of knowledge workers, offers a
model for this new mode of production (Rigi 2013).
One of the strengths of Fuchs’s argument is that he
emphasizes the role of prosumers and their inherent con-
tradiction with capitalism—a capitalism that he rightly
emphasizes is still based on the law of value. However,
he mistakenly considers prosumers to be producers of
surplus value when it would be more accurate to see
them as productive of a commons that is used to extract
rent from advertisers.
Arvidsson and Colleoni are right in claiming that we
now have new social forms that Marx’s theory of value
did not anticipate and cannot explain. But these forms
are not monetized forms of value such as revenues from
advertisements and brands, rent, yields from fictitious
capital, or revenues earned from financial speculation.
All these phenomena and anything that has to do with
money is within the reach of Marx’s theory of value and
can be adequately explained by it, even so-called ficti-
tious commodities that have prices but do not include
value in the Marxian sense.
What really goes beyond Marx’s theory of value, and
by the same token beyond capitalism, is the peer produc-
tion of a universal commons of knowledge by knowledge
workers, including prosumers. Indeed, a subsection of
such workers has established commons-based peer pro-
duction that negates the law of value altogether, even if
it remains under the law’s sway (Bauwens 2009; Meretz
2012; Rigi 2013). This is not a cause for despair among
Marxists. Indeed, Marx would be the first to celebrate it.
Peer production is identical with what he described as
advanced communism. After all, he spent much of his
life on a political project that aimed at abolishing the law
of value. Marx’s theory of value thus has a clear under-
standing of the historical limits of its validity.
NOTES
1. The same revenue is counted by Jhally and Livant once as rent
and then again as surplus value/profit. Profit is a yield from the
investment of capital and rent is revenue earned through
exchanging the use value of a monopoly-owned asset for
money. Revenues that the networks receive from advertisers
either is rent, which is part of the surplus value produced out-
side the television networks, or is value produced by the watch-
ing labor of the audience. It cannot simultaneously be both.
2. Here we give an account of Marx’s theory of value and surplus
value within the capitalist mode of production. Therefore, like
him, we abstract from other forms of labor and only consider
the wage labor that produces commodities. We think that
methodologically this is a legitimate move. We recognize that
various forms of unwaged labor, such as slave labor or inden-
tured labor, that produce commodities can also be the origin of
value and surplus value. The most prevalent form of such labor
is the unwaged labor of small holders, whether peasants or
small entrepreneurs, who do not exploit wage labor. Capitalists
extract surplus value from them through the mechanisms of
unequal exchange (Mandel [1972] 1978, chapter 3). We return
to this point later when we discuss the origin of the rents paid
to media companies.
3. If I buy a piece of fabric and pay a tailor to make a coat for me,
although the tailor performs wage labor and produces use
value, (s)he does not produce a commodity, and thus does not
produce surplus value because the coat is not put on the market
(Marx 1969).
4. Fuchs (2012) in his rejoinder to Arvidsson and Colleoni is cor-
rect to claim, as we show in due course, that Arvidsson and
Colleoni confuse value and price. However, Fuchs uses Marx’s
distinction between value and price to claim that only a small
portion of the value produced by prosumers is transformed
into prices and the rest is wasted. This is a mistaken argument.
While something with no exchange value can have a price,
something without a price has no exchange value, even if it is
the product of labor. Price is a condition for the existence of
exchange value. Products of labor that are not sold on the mar-
ket have no exchange value because they are not commodities.
Marx is explicit in this respect. The “price of a commodity
constantly stands above or below the value of the commodity,
and the value of the commodity itself exists only in this up-
and-down movement of commodity prices” (Marx 1857–1858
quoted in Fuchs 2012, 634, emphasis added). Why does Marx
explicitly say this? It goes back to the determination of value.
Value is congealed labor, but it is congealed social labor, not
individual labor. Individual labor can only become part of the
total social labor through exchange and to the extent that its
products are sold. In other words individual labor is not imme-
diately social; it can only become social through the mediation
of exchange (see Marx 1976). Marx explains this as follows.
Capitalist society as a whole divides its total abstract labor
among different branches according to its total need for vari-
ous goods and services. However, this distribution of social
labor does not take place through a plan but through mecha-
nisms of exchange, supply, and demand. The goods and serv-
ices that are not sold are not demanded by society; therefore,
from the point of view of society they are wasted, and the labor
spent on them is wasted too (the labor does not become part of
the total social labor). Therefore, value cannot exist without
price. Hence, Fuchs’s argument that prosumers produce value
that is not transferred into price is mistaken. If this were
true then the total sum of value could be much higher than
the total sum of prices. This contradicts Marx’s famous
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thesis that these two sums are equal (see the later section
on the critique of philia).
5. CPT or CPM is a measure of the cost of advertising for the
advertiser. It is a measure for advertising prices. It is not a
measure of the production cost of advertisements for media. If
ad prices represented value, value produced by audience, then
CPT would represent c C v C s, or more precisely, c C v C p
(constant capital C variable capitalC profit). Thus, CPT, or
CPM, is a good approximate empirical measure to test
whether audiences produce exchange value. We say approxi-
mate because value has no independent empirical existence
and can only be expressed empirically through price. Thus,
we can approximately compare values through comparing cor-
responding prices, in this case CPTs.
6. This point requires a qualifying note. The workers who pro-
duce and publish an ad may create value and surplus value in
the classical Marxian sense. Although a small portion of an
ad’s price may consist of such value, its overwhelming portion
derives from rent.
7. Smythe is correct if we understand him to be saying that learn-
ing what to buy accelerates the realization of the value of
advertised commodities. In other words, by reading/watching
ads, audiences cut the circulation time of commodities and in
this way help the annual surplus value to grow. In this way we
could say that the audience performs free labor. However, this
labor does not directly produce a commodity or value.
Whether we call the audience’s activities “labor” or something
else, such activity does not produce exchange value.
Advertising’s effect of increasing demand only transfers value
from commodities in low demand to those in high demand.
We address this in critiquing Arvidsson and Colleoni later on.
8. Market relations between media, advertisers, and ratings com-
panies as well, fundamentally influence advertising prices
(Meehan 1984; 1993). This may help explain in part why aver-
age CPTs in certain Latin American countries are higher than
those in North America, as extreme media concentration in
these countries would allow media there to extract higher
advertising rents.
9. We do not mean that actual readers of a particular newspaper
or viewers of a particular program are homogeneous, just that
they are assumed to be homogeneous in CPT calculations.
10. Newspapers with a global reach such as the Wall Street Jour-
nal and networks such as CNN are exceptions.
11. We must emphasize though that the origin of this rent is sur-
plus value, which is produced outside the rented media space.
Advertisers give away part of the revenues (metamorphosed
surplus value) they have acquired in different forms (profit,
interest, rent, tribute, taxes, etc.). Here, as with land, owner-
ship over space is the means of transforming surplus value
into rent.
12. Information is defined here as cognitive or perceptual forms
that are expressed in signs and symbols. Examples on social
media include status updates and feedback that are collected
as personal data along with registration information.
13. One reviewer of this article wondered whether paying social
media users for their provision of personal data changes the
determination of whether “presumption” counts as labor that
is productive of value. This is an interesting question. There
are a number of startups that are experimenting with monetar-
ily rewarding people for their data (see, e.g., Money For My
Data, http://www.moneyformydata.com). However, such pay-
ments would have to be extremely low, in large part because
“raw data” are easily obtained from numerous sources nowa-
days and are duplicable at little cost. Thus, it has an exchange
value bordering on zero. (see Steel, Locke, Cadman, and
Freese 2013).
14. For most material goods an increase in the volume of produc-
tion decreases the cost of fixed capital per unit of the commod-
ity. The reduction of fixed capital occurs piecemeal (the
greater the number of units of commodities the less the share
of fixed capital in each unit). However, the cost of labor and
raw materials, other conditions being equal, does not decrease
with an increase in the volume of production. Therefore, the
value of such commodities never tends toward zero, as its
lower limit is the cost of raw materials plus the value the labor
adds to this cost. However, the digital reproduction of infor-
mation follows a different rule. The cost of the first digital
copy is already approaching zero.
15. Universal commons are commons that can be used simulta-
neously everywhere and are not subjected to wear and tear.
Bounded commons, like a forest or a lake, cannot be simulta-
neously everywhere and are subjected to wear and tear. Uni-
versal commons have no time and space boundaries. Bounded
commons have both spatial and temporal boundaries.
16. Although the difference between waged and unwaged knowl-
edge worker does influence their common capacity to produce
universal commons, we are setting aside this difference for the
moment.
17. By “fenced in” we mean measures that prevent the free flow of
data/information and its free use by everyone. There are three
major mechanism of fencing: trade secrets, intellectual prop-
erty, and censorship. The mechanism most relevant to our dis-
cussion is intellectual property.
18. It is important to remember that the data-related service econ-
omy is not limited to social media companies. One of the
authors conducted research at the Budapest branch of multina-
tional company that provides data-related services to a number
of major banks and insurance and pharmaceutical companies
with a global reach. Indeed, the company does not sell data/
information to its client companies. By contrast, it receives the
data for free from its clients. It then charges the clients for ana-
lyzing, structuring, and securely storing the structured data and
giving the clients secure access to the stored data. A key spe-
cialist in the company told the author that most database com-
panies make their profits not through selling information but
rather by providing data-related services. Naturally, these
services may have exchange value, though not necessarily.
19. We can reach the same conclusion by another route. Of course
the telecommunications industry has costs but if we divide the
total expenses of this industry by the volume of data that is
globally transported in a given period, the cost of the transpor-
tation of a gigabite of data will be almost negligible. Telecom-
munication companies extract monopoly rents far above the
real costs.
20. It could be asked: If information has no exchange value, what
then motivates public and private investment in science and
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technology? Public investment in science and technology is
usually not motivated by profit. It is usually intended for two
purposes. First is to contribute to the expansion of the existing
general intellect that is available for free to the public, includ-
ing capitalists. A second purpose is for military purposes. In
both cases knowledge is not commoditized. In the first, it is a
universal commons and in the second a military secret. It goes
without saying that the production of general intellect by pub-
lic institutions at cost to taxpayers serves also the interests of
capitalists, because general intellect is a requirement for the
accumulation of capital, though it has no value. A qualifying
note is in order here. Although public research institutions
may bring their discoveries under intellectual property to
extract rent, as we discuss in the following in the case of pri-
vate investment in science and technology these rents are a
portion of the surplus value that is produced outside the inves-
ting institutions.
Private investment in science and technology is indeed
motivated by making profits. The produced knowledge is typi-
cally used for the manufacturing of goods or services that are
sold as commodities. The knowledge itself is kept as a trade
secret and has no value but it can help the manufacturer to
extract extra surplus value from outside the manufacturing
enterprise, though the commodities that the enterprise itself
produces may also have value and include surplus value. This
occurs in two major ways. In the first, the secret knowledge
enhances the productivity of the enterprise enabling it to pro-
duce its commodity more cheaply and then sell it above its
value, extracting an extra surplus value from its competitors
(Marx 1976, 434–436). In the second, the knowledge consists
of the design for a new product or for the modification of an
existing one, enabling the enterprise to produce it alone and
extract extra profit by setting a high monopoly price. In both
cases the investor can extract extra surplus value from outside
the enterprise as long as knowledge is kept secret. If the
knowledge enters the public domain, or if competitors dis-
cover this knowledge, the investor privilege of extracting extra
surplus value will end.
21. Although enclosure can be a source of primitive accumulation,
the two are not always identical. The enclosure of information
creates new possibilities for the extraction of rent which is a
normal aspect of capital accumulation, not primitive accumu-
lation (Marx 1991).
22. Refer back to our earlier discussion of the difference between
value and price.
23. Of course, interest rates and the availability of credit influence
consumer demand as well.
24. Facebook, at the time of writing, has a price-to-earnings ratio
of 121.23 (http://ycharts.com/companies/FB/pe_ratio, accessed
November 17, 2013).
25. For example, if you lease your apartment for $10,000 per year
and the interest rate is 5% then the value of your apartment as
interest-bearing capital is 10,000 divided by 5%, which is
$200,000.
26. Rate of profit is rate of exploitation divided by (organic com-
position C 1). Organic composition is constant capital divided
by variable capital. Therefore, the rate of profit always has a
positive correlation with the rate of exploitation. Although a
change in the rate ofprofit might be only due to a change in
organic composition, we could say that the rate of profit
reflects that of the rate of exploitation. This is particularly so
for the general average rate of profit, which is calculated on
basis of the average social organic composition of capital for a
given period (Marx 1991).
27. Although state monetary policies in fixing interest rates are
also an important factor for financial operations and influence
the workings of the law of value, in the long run these policies
are conditioned upon the law of value, namely, the concrete
conjecture of the economic cycle (growth, stagnation, crisis).
Crises such as the liquidity crisis for banks in 2008–2009 may
also be related to cash flow and the availability of credit. In
periods of growth the exchange rate is relatively low and sta-
ble, which are good conditions for fictitious capital.
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